

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.	
AD/CI		29,759	
DOC. NO. -		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED	
DOC. DATE 11 July 1951		-	
COPY NO. 1		LOGGED BY	
NUMBER OF PAGES 1		pod	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			
Statement, w/3 Atts.			
3 Publications			
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each item.			

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO :

[Redacted]

Guinn

11 July 1951

FROM :

AD/Current Intelligence

[Redacted]

SUBJECT:

I am enclosing a brief for the DCI for use at tomorrow's conference, together with copies of some of our publications of TOP SECRET classification.

This is sent in response to a request of the DDCI.

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[Redacted]

KINGMAN DOUGLASS

Encl: Statement "The Office of Current Intelligence" w 3 attachs. in quad.

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The Office of Current Intelligence (O/CI)

For a long time there was the need for an office within the Government which would collate and evaluate current intelligence from all of the sources available to the U. S. Government, and would distribute it quickly to the officials who make policy. Nothing was done about this until the creation of O/CI on 1 February 1951.

This office is the "watchdog" over all developments reported by any means, overt or covert, to any and every intelligence agency of the Government. As such, it must and does function on a twenty-four hour basis.

Intelligence is useless unless it is put into the hands of the men and agencies who make U. S. policy, In cases of extreme emergency, it must be put there immediately.

The product of the O/CI stems from two main sources of information:

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- (2) Collateral Intelligence is made up of reports from any source whatever, public or secret, emanating from the foreign radio broadcasts, foreign publications, private individuals, from the operations of the CIA, Department of State, and the Service Departments. This provides the

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great mass of material—political, military, economic, agricultural, and scientific—which must be sorted, evaluated and painstakingly fitted together like the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle to form a picture having meaning to the expert analyst.

No office which does not have access to all-source material could maintain the continuing watch on world developments which is essential for the formulation of national policy by the President and executive agencies. A clear channel exists for transmission of this intelligence, quickly and with essential background and evaluation, through the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee to the President and the National Security Council.

So that there will be no delay in the flow of this material, the O/CI maintains the CIA "watch" on a twenty-four hour basis. Each significant item of information—whatever hour it might be received—is called to the attention of trained intelligence duty officers who have the responsibility of seeing that such information is passed on without delay to those who need it.

In order to bring the important items of all-source intelligence to the attention of the men who make our national policy, and, as well, of those who carry it out, O/CI does the following:

- (1) It prepares a daily, high-level bulletin for the President and a half dozen other officials;
- (2) It is responsible for the daily briefing of the President and the Director of Central Intelligence;

TOP SECRET

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- (3) It maintains a Situation Room, equivalent to the "War Room" of a commanding general, in which maps and charts of key areas and important developments in the many fields affecting the national security, are kept up to date, and in which frequent briefings of operational personnel take place;
- (4) It publishes a Daily Digest for general use; two weekly summaries dealing with developments of current importance; and periodic intelligence memoranda collating the most recent information on vital situations, intended primarily for the use of offices like O/NE, O/SI, O/RR, and the other IAC Agencies.

The O/CI also maintains a Special Soviet Strategy Staff which has the job of making a continuing study and evaluation of all indications, throughout the world, which may give a hint as to the intentions of the Soviet and Satellite rulers.

I have with me several samples of the output of O/CI. Three of these samples are publications:

- a. The first is a working paper called the Daily Digest, which is widely distributed among personnel who have the need to keep abreast of developments, generally, all over the world.
- b. The second example is a weekly digest through which O/CI attempts to keep responsible officials periodically informed of recent developments in areas of current or potential importance.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- c. The third is an intelligence memorandum of the type which is issued on short notice whenever it may become necessary by reason of a new element in a continuing situation.
- d. Others illustrate the graphic technique of intelligence presentation.

Let me give you a current example of how O/CI performs its "watchdog" function. The first concerns the Korean War. Shortly before Mr. Malik made the speech which led to the cease-fire talks, indications of a Communist build-up in Korea began to multiply. These came from a variety of sources, from prisoner of war interrogations at the front, to contacts inside China. They included: reports of replacement of decimated Chinese armies; reinforcement of North Korean divisions with men trained in Manchuria; movements of tanks and AA artillery; increased Communist efforts to fight UN air power in the air; and conferences of high-level military leaders on the enemy side. By comparing the pattern of these developments with those which preceded previous Communist offensives, by late June it was possible to predict that by the second week of July the Red Chinese and North Korean armies would be ready to resume the attack, possibly with the new element of strong tank support and an air component capable not only of defense but also of strikes against UN bases and communications. In other words, we can say with some assurance that should the cease-fire talks fail, a new Communist offensive probably would be imminent.

-4-

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In O/CI for the first time in the history of American intelligence we have a single place in which all current intelligence from every source available to your Government is brought together and reviewed, so that really important items--with spot interpretations--can be passed on immediately to the policy makers who need it.

The time during which O/CI has been operating is scarcely long enough to enable us to make a definitive judgment upon its detailed operations. The time has been sufficient, however, I believe, for me to be able to say that the concept on which it is based is sound. That is the concept that in order to avoid another Pearl Harbor, we should see to it that the men who make the final decisions have all the information that your Government is able to supply them--and that without delay.

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